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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The subject matter of this appeal is that of domestic
relations relative to child support and visitation.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of this appeal is
vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(h) which states:
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(h)appeals from district court involving
domestic relations cases, including but not
limited to divorce, annulment, property
division, child custody, support, visitation,
adoption, and paternity;

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
On September 18, 1985 Blanca H. Charlesworth and the
State of California submitted to the Department of Social
Services a petition to obtain an obligation of support against
Laurian P. Charlesworth pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act, (hereinafter referred to as "URESA").
At a hearing before the Domestic Relations Commissioner for Weber
County the payment of child support by Mr. Charlesworth was
conditioned upon his being able to visit with the minor children.
He was ordered to pay $76.00 per month per child, said payments
were to be made to and held by the Weber County Clerk Office.
Counsel for defendants requested a review by the district court.
The district court upon review affirmed the order of the Domestic
Relations Commissioner.

Counsel for plaintiff's then filed their

Notice of Appeal to this forum.
1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the District Court has jurisdiction to

adjudicate visitation privileges in a proceeding under the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.

2.

Whether the payment of child support can be

terminated or withheld as a result of the noncustodial parent
being unable to exercise his rights of visitation.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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aside the order .J: uie Commissioner.
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The defendants appealed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 18, 1985 Blanca H. Charlesworth and the
State of California submitted an URESA petitionf alleging that
Blanca H. Charlesworth's former husband, Laurian P. Charlesworth,
is the father of Joseph Charlesworth, born February 3, 1980;
Patrick Charlesworth, born January 7, 1982; and Charlene
Charlesworth, born March 18, 1983 and that an order of support
needed to be established for the three children.
On August 2, 1988, Laurian P. Charlesworth was served
with a Petition for Support, and an Order to Show Cause why he
should not be ordered to pay a reasonable sum of ongoing child
support in accordance with the California URESA petition.

At the

October 18, 1988 hearing on the Order to Show Cause, respondent
was represented by Pete N. Vlahos, Esq., and the State of
California was represented by Utah Assistant Attorney General
Karl G. Perry.

The Order resulting from that hearing required

the respondent to begin making payments of $76.00 a month per
child for ongoing child support.
Paragraph 3 of the Order reads, "That the Weber County
Clerk's Office is directed to hold said funds until the
Defendant, Blanca H. Charlesworth, allows the Plaintiff
visitation with the minor children."

The rest of the Order goes

on to detail the visitation allowed and abates the support during
the times of summer visitation.
The Order of the Commissioner was objected to by Utah
Assistant Attorney General Karl Perry.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
That in a proceeding brought under the URESA provisions
found in Utah Code Annotated § 77-31-1 1953, as amended, the only
subject matter jurisdiction bestowed upon the District Court for
the State of Utah is the determination of an obligation of child
support and the enforcement of the same, and does not provide for
im personum jurisdiction upon that parent which initiated the
URESA action.
That the District Court lacks jurisdiction under the
URESA statutes of the State of Utah to adjudicate any domestic
issue related to visitation, and that the withholding of the
payment of support cannot be authorized as a means to enforce the
rights of visitation of the noncustodial parent in that the right
to support belongs to the child and should not be held hostage
because of the conduct of one of the parents.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKS JURISDICTION
TO HEAR AND ADJUDICATE ISSUES INVOLVING
VISITATION IN A URESA ACTION
The State of Utah f on beha if of the State of
California, asks lor relief from that portion of the Distr^rrt.
Court' s 0 rd<•> r i i"> 1

, iesworth' s receipt

child support payments lor '.*-.-? three minor children on
respondent's satisfactior ^r ^ •*- visitation right ,s 1 r Mic r^asr 'i
that the iniiqinoiii

i I brMiviajjo this ilourt had neither subject

matter jurisdiction nor personal jurisdiction over Blanca H.
Charlesworth or IHM minor children to mi -jnd ir\it t* ^ i s i M M '»ii
i ightG

i in f 11J •> Hi'11',: ti\ i a s e .
In Patterson v. Patterson, 581 1},2d 824 (Kan.App.

1978)

decree of divor <
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.he lather t
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i Texas r vy>'her< ,• i

,.c^ child support, granted custody t

t:he mother and awarded the father rights of visitation,
the father moved

II .-

After

• '-'is, t:i le mo ther i i i i tlated in URESA

pet i nion f seeking ^ m or cement of the child support order i n the
responding state of Kansas
father to pay $25
(

ursement upon

rights,
The appe

The Kansas trial court ordered the
i i i supp< :>::i : ! :f b\ it cond i tioned the

...- mother's fulfill Ing r he father's visitation

.'lie Kansas Court • f Appeals reversed tn-i<

tni:
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The purpose of the URESA is to improve and
extend by reciprocal legislation the enforcement
of duties of support. The goal sought by this
legislation is to provide a prompt, expeditious
way of enforcing the duty to support minor children
without getting the parties involved in other
complex, collateral issues. The act specifically
declares that the remedies therein provided are in
addition to an not in substitution for any other
remedies. Nothing in the act allows the adjudication
of child custody or visitation privileges
or other matters commonly determined in domestic
relations cases. We conclude that the trial court's
order that payment of child support be withheld unless
visitation rights are granted by the plaintiff was
beyond its jurisdiction. The trial court did not have
jurisdiction over the minor child for the reason
that she was neither physically present in Seward
County nor domiciled in Kansas and she had not
been the subject of previous exercise by the
court of its jurisdiction to determine her
custody or care.
Id. at 825 (citations omitted).
In State ex rel. State of Washington v. Bozarth, 722
P.2d 48 (Or. App. 1986), the court decided to join the "weight of
authority from other jurisdictions that have considered the
question" (see footnote 2 of the opinion for citations to other
cases), in determining that "interference with visitation rights
may not be raised in" a URESA petition.

Id. at 49.

The court

explicitly adopted the rationale stated in State ex. rel. Hubbard
v. Hubbard, 329 N.W. 2d 202 (Wis. 1983):
The very purpose of the URESA requires
that it be procedurally and substantively
streamlined. Interstate enforcement of support
obligations will be impaired if matters of
custody, visitation, or a custodial parent's
contempt are considered by the responding court.
The introduction of such collateral issues will burden
the efficiency of the URESA resolution of
other family matters in a URESA proceeding may
deter persons from invoking the URESA.
8

Bozarr;

:;

Accord, Vigil v. V i g i l , 494 P.2d 609 (Colo. App.

*?72'; County of Clearwater v. Petrash, 598 P.2d!
"^ ' ~-:- :-^<"
:-7 . . -e

^ g ^ c v . Madden,

<>

. .
, - -\pp.

•:ourt : i lower: its' holding in Bozarth, Supra and held

that,
The support obligation runs to the child, not
to the mother.... the interstate enforcement
of support obligations would be greatly
impared if matters of custody, visitation and
individual conduct were considered by the
responding court in and URESA proceeding.
While these precedents I inm ni IHM iur i, .srlict lunt" iinj mil
. -.nrity ovpr thio U O U I L , v.:,e utan URESA crov;sions
express clear legislative intent for c o u n ^ *. r interpret *:-e Utah
provisions i n accordant

-

•,,

^

-u

\

prov isi ons from,, other jurisdictions . The act states,
This act shall be so interpreted and construed
as to effectuate its general purposes to make
uniform the law of those states wh i ch enact i t.
Utah Code Annotated §77-3] -38.
Utah's URESA provision explicitly prov.
part i.c:ipdf. .ion '"»! MI

••;.•

•

. •;

• * in an URESA proceeding does

not confer jurisdiction over that petitioner in otner matters.
Utah Code Annotated §77-31 31 reads,
Participation in any proceedings under
this act shall not confer upon any court
jurisdiction of any of the parties thereto
in any other proceeding.
The scope of jurisdiction vested in the District Court in a URESA
action is set forth in Utah ("ode An it it,i fori §7 7--<n«"! ^h i.h n ^ d s :

How duties of support enforced. All duties
of support, including arrearagesf and arrearages
reimbursable to the state or a political subdivision thereof are enforceable by action
irrespective of the relationship between the
obligor and the obligee. Actions authorized
under this act include establishment of paternity,
wage assignmentsf garnishment, liensf execution
of liens, contempt proceedings and any other
collection or enforcement procedure.
When there is a lack of jurisdiction be it over
the person or the subject matter then any judgment or order
entered in a proceeding relying on such jurisdiction is void and
of no effect.

In Bowen v. Olsen, 246 P.2d 602 (Utah 1952), the

trial court entered a default judgment against the defendant in a
quiet title suit.

The defendant challenged the order of the

trial court more than three years after it was entered, arguing
that the plaintiffs' service of process upon him was
insufficient.

The Utah Supreme Court finding that service of

process was insufficient determined that because the trial court
never had jurisdiction over the defendant, the trial court's
order was "void on its face for lack of jurisdiction of the
court", and doctrines of laches and res judicata did not bar the
defendant's challenge.

Bowen at 606.

In Pifer v. Pifer, 229

S.E.2d 700 (North Carolina 1976), the parties were divorced in
Florida.

Mr. Pifer moved to North Carolina and in 1973 Mrs.

Pifer filed a Petition for Support and affidavit in Florida under
an URESA action.

Judge Cline in the trial court in North

Carolina ordered Mr. Pifer to pay current child support and also
ordered that Mr. Pifer be allowed to visit the children in North
Carolina and that such visitation be denied, all support payments
10

would immediately cease.

Mr. Pifer ceased payments

n December

-)£ 1973 based upon
ecite*- .

:>:

.-.. U L S L U ^ ; . attorney filed ^ i r

strike that order terminating

i

: > payment m

the same null anc

n o t e d that " [I]:
m a t t e r , t h e judgment

the

^iLnerai aiia:K ;n a previous order and

that the order must remaan
IJ|: c):i

support and declare
>-

ground that 11 w^

on appeal

jn to

• -ff^^r <r^ I

.

reversal or modified

<

; u u n ;.^ :\
-

-, . . ina

jurisdiction ovei tht subject
-u

whet>

considered uie u., u . .i.i^ori in a n URESA

proceeding ;,. • enter ^, .:i-. pertaining t > visitation privileges
in Florida a n d North Carolina,

T h e Court after rovi^w o!i" L„he

U R E S A s»' '*! ntfj'i:? nj I IiM't.h Carolina con.cl.uded that:
""""This duty of support is t h e only
subject matter covered b y URESA. Nothing
in t h e a c t allows t h e adjudication of
child custody o r visitation privileges o r
other matters commonly determined i n
domestic relation cases.
...it is o u r opinion that Judge Cline
in t h e responding state of North Carolina
had jurisdiction only t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r
the defendant owed a duty of support to
his children in t h e initiating state of
Florida f ...Judge Cline had no jurisdiction
whatsoever to condition the support
payments upon certain visitation privileges...
Consequently Judge Cline had no authority to
permit a discontinuance of the support
payments upon a finding by him of an alleged
violation of the condition of visitation
privileges. Thus the ex parte orders...
permitting the defendant to cease support
payments, are manifestly null and voidf and
Judge Edens erred in refusing to hear the
state's motion to set these orders aside."
i±

Pifer at 703.

In Hoover v. Hoover, 246 S.E.2d 179 (South

Carolina 1978) the issue again considered whether a court had
jurisdiction under URESA to impose visitation conditions on the
duty of support.

The Supreme Court cited Pifer v. Pifer, Id. and

ruled that a court of the responding state had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate matters of visitation.

See also People of the State

of Illinois ex rel. Winger v. Young, 397 N.E.2d 253 (Illinois
1979) held that under URESAf a responding court lacks authority
to withhold child support payments until custodial parent makes
child available for visitation.
In Fitzwater v. Fitzwater, 294 N.W.2d 249
(Michigan 1980) the Court of Appeals considered the question of
whether a Michigan court has in personam jurisdiction to modify a
foreign divorce decree in an URESA proceeding.

The Court stated

that "[T]he act does not, of course, grant in personam
jurisdiction over a nonresident party not otherwise subject to
the power of Michigan courts." Fitzwater at 251.

In Thompson v.

Kite, 522 P.2d 327 (Kansas 1974) the defendant Kite and her
children were residents of the state of Missouri.

She had

petitioned for an URESA action in Kansas where the plaintiff Mr.
Thompson resided.

Subsequent thereto the plaintiff in an

independent action petitioned for injunctive relief from the
payment of child support because he had been unable to exercise
visitation.

Mrs. Kite filed a motion to dismiss the petition for

want of jurisdiction and the district court sustained her motion.
The plaintiff appealed, claiming that Mrs. Kite having appeared
12

In the reciprocal proceeding in Kansas and having entered into an
agreement : ->r * isitation had submittnd horsnit hn. r ni«
H"" district court and that by failing to abide
y tne agreement entered therein was amendable to
jurisdiction

L

' ' *

n n l nmii i . in-1

: <

* '

"•

rids.

Kansas affirmed tne ^augment or ~ne i .strict
court dismissing t !*.e petition tor va-^

d jurisdiction

Court expounded u. • * ••

*.e
ts

purpose "was to enable parties to participate freely
reciprocal proceedings without exposino
of submit*

+

demselves ::o tne danger

•

jcjnding court i n

other independent proceedings involving collateral matters."
Thompson v. Kitef Id. at 330.
BfM'vtuFP i inj (iisirirt Court 101 Vdfbex; County State of
Utah had no in personam jurisdiction over Blanca H
or the subject child nor subiect
domes t n

*

Charlesworth

• n *

i oinn-.-M MI I i \ h,in i hi hi . ippun

. . :nib >.Jr£b/'

proceeding, the Recommended Order signed by the Commissions^ and
its' affirmation by the D- • •

* -

~>

1 < - s.ii nt that on] y the ^^riLon dealing wicn cni^a support
should stand.
11.
THE CONTINUOUS PAYMENT OF THE CHILD SUPPORT
OBLIGATION SHOULD NOT BE MADE CONTINGENT
UPON THE FREE EXERCISE OF VISITATION
Regardless

i whether there * <•: -jurisdiction und^* a

URESA ac=

adjudications as *-• issues
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of visitation and child custody, the obligation to pay child
support and the enforcement of the same is separate and apart
from the enforcement of visitation interests.

Utah Code

Annotated §78-45-3 states that "Every man shall support his
child;...".

In Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516 (Utah 1981), two

parties were divorced, and in their divorce decree, the trial
court adopted by reference the parties' stipulation to deprive
the husband of all parental rights and obligations.

One month

later, in an action to collect child support, the district court
amended the divorce decree and ordered the father to pay child
support.

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial

court, stating that,
There is no merit to the contention that
the parents' stipulation effectively terminated
the father's parental obligations. The right to
support from the parents belongs to the minor
children and is not subject to being bartered
away, extinguished, estopped or in any way
defeated by the agreement or conduct of the
parents.
Hills, at 517 (citations omitted).

In Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548

P.2d 895 (Utah 1976) it was determined that a child's right to
support is his own right, not his parent's.

In French v.

Johnson, 401 P.2d 315 (Utah 1965) the Utah Supreme Court
determined that an award of child support in a decree cannot be
avoided by the conduct or agreement of the parents

See also

Reeves v. Reeves, 556 P.2d 1267, 1268 (Utah 1976)("The children
are unconditionally entitled to support from their parents; and
the State is authorized by law and should be encouraged and aided
as a matter of public policy to see that responsibility is borne
14

by them, both initially and in any necessary subsequent
proceedings.")(emphasis added),

in Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d

1303 (Utah 1980), this Court refused to impose a system whereby
the noncustodial parents obligation to provide support would be
conditioned upon the custodial parents compliance with the
legally-prescribed minimum rights of visitation.

A stay of

execution was lifted on a child support judgement in Race v.
Race, 740 P.2d 253 (Utah 1987) , where it was held that child
support was an obligation imposed for the benefit of the
children, not the divorcing spouse.
By conditioning the dispersal of the minor children's
support from their father upon Blanca H. Charlesworth's
accommodation of respondent's right of visitation is contrary to
the letter and spirit of the law and in fact becomes a weapon
wielded against the child to force a child's visitation with a
noncustodial parent.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §77-31-38 it should be
the intent of this Court to construe and effectuate the general
purposes of the Utah URESA provisions in uniformity with the laws
of those states which have enacted URESA.

The weight of

authority in those states which have considered this question is
that the only subject matter and purpose of URESA is to
effectuate and enforce the payment of child support nation wide.
No where in the URESA statutes for the state of Utah is there a
grant of jurisdiction to hear matters relating to visitation.
15

There is no basis upon which the District Court can claim in
personam jurisdiction over Blanca H. Charlesworth or the subject
children, even though the divorce was in Utah.

Therefore,

because the District Court had no jurisdiction under the URESA
proceedings to address visitation issuesf and even if the
District Court had jurisdiction over respondent's visitation
rights, the laws of Utah clearly forbids conditioning the payment
of the child support obligations in any way.

In particular there

is no authority for the District Court in a URESA proceeding to
terminate or withhold the payment of child support in the manner
ordered by the District Court in this matter.

This Court should

declare the order of the District Court of March 1989 and the
orders entered at the hearings on August 2, 1989 null and void
for lack of jurisdiction of the court.
DATED this /0^\jay

of August, 1989.

Attorney General
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PROOF OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Appellants Brief to Pete N. Vlahos counsellor
respondent at 2447 Kiesel Ave., Ogden, Utah 84401 on this /£#^day
of August, 1989.

ey General
Attorney for Appellants
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ADDENDUM
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UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT
77-31-1. Purposes. - The purposes of this act are to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation and enforcement of duties of support and to make uniform the law with respect thereto.
77-31-2. Definitions. As used in this act, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "State" includes any state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of
Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law or procedure is in effect.
(2) "Initiating state" means any state in which a proceeding pursuant to this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is commenced.
(3) "Responding state" means any state in which any proceeding pursuant to the proceeding
in the initiating state is or may be commenced.
(4) "Court" means the district court of this state and when the context requires, means the
court of any other state as defined in a substantially similar reciprocal law.
(5) "Law" includes both common and statutory law.
(6) "Duty of support" includes any duty of support imposed or imposable by law, or by any
court order, decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce, legal separation, separate maintenance or otherwise.
(7) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support.
(8) "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is owed and a state or political
subdivision thereof.
(9) "Governor" includes any person performing the functions of governor or the executive
authority of any territory covered by the provisions of this act.
(10) "Support order" means any judgment, decree or order of support, whether temporary
or final, whether subject to modification, revocation or remission regardless of the kind of action
in which it is entered.
(11) "Rendering state" means any state in which a support order is originally entered.
(12) "Registering court" means any district court of this state in which the support order of
the rendering state is registered.
(13) "Register" means to file in the registry of foreign support orders.
(14) "Certification" shall be in accordance with the laws of the certifying state.
(15) "Department" means the Utah state Department of social services.
(16) "Title IV-D Agency" means the single and separate agency designated to enforce child
support under an approved state plan pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act and authorized to reimburse costs and pay incentive under that title.
77-31-3. - Remedies additional to those now existing. - The remedies herein provided are in
addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies.
77-31-4. - Extent of duties of support. - Duties of support arising under the law of this state
when applicable under section 77-31-7 bind the obligor, present in this state, regardless of the
presence or residence of the obligee.
77-31-5. - Interstate rendition. - The governor of this state (1) may demand from the governor of any other state the surrender of any person found in such other state who is charged in
this state with the crime of failing to provide for the support of any person in this state and (2)
may surrender on demand by the governor of any other state any person found in this state who
is charged in such other state with the crime of failing to provide for the support of any person in
such other state. The provisions for extradition of criminals not inconsistent herewith shall apply
to any such demand although the person whose surrender is demanded was not in the demanding
state at the time of the commission of the crime and although he had not fled therefrom. Neither
the demand, the oath nor any proceedings for extradition pursuant to this section need state or
show that the person whose surrender is demanded has fled from justice, or at the time of the
Commission of the crime was in the demanding or other state.
77-31-6. - Conditions of interstate rendition. - (1) Before making the demand on the governor
of any other state for the surrender of a person charged in this state with the crime of failing to
provide for the support of any person, the governor of this state may require any county attorney
of this state to satisfy him that at least sixty days prior thereto the obligee brought an action for
the support under this act, or that the bringing of an action would be of no avail.

iating state.
77-31-15. - Cost and fees. - There shall be no filing fee or other costs taxable to the obligee,
but a court of this state acting either as an initiating or responding state may in its discretion direct
that any part of or all fees and costs incurred in this state, including without limitation by enumeration, fees for filing, service of process, seizure of property, and stenographic service of both petitioner and respondent or either, be paid by the obligor.
77-31-16. - Jurisdiction by arrest. - When the court of this state, acting either as an initiating
or responding state, has reason to believe that the respondent may flee the jurisdiction it may (1)
as an initiating state request in its certificate that the court of the responding state obtain the body
of the defendant by appropriate process if that be permissible under the law of the responding
state; or (2) as a responding state, obtain the body of the respondent by appropriate process.
77-31-17. - State information agency. - The department is hereby designated as the state information agency under this act, and it shall:
(1) Compile a list of the courts and their addresses in this state having jurisdiction under this
act and transmit the same to the state information agency of every other state which has adopted
this or a substantially similar act: and
(2) Maintain a register of such lists received from other states and transmit copies thereof as
soon as possible after receipt to every court in this state having jurisdiction under this act.
77-31-18. - Duty of court and county attorney of this state as responding state. - (1) After
the court of this state acting as a responding state has received from the court of the initiating
state the aforesaid copies, the clerk of the court shall docket the case and notify the county attorney of his action.
(2) It shall be the duty of the county attorney diligently to prosecute the case. He shall take
all action necessary in accordance with the laws of this state to give the court jurisdiction of the
respondent or his property and shall request the court to set a time and place for a hearing.
77-31-19. - Further duties of court and county attorney of this state in the responding state.
(1) The county attorney shall, on his own initiative, use all means at his disposal to trace the respondent or his property and if, due to inaccuracies of the petition or otherwise, the court cannot
obtain jurisdiction, the county attorney shall inform the court of what he has done and request
the court to continue the case pending receipt of more accurate information or an amended petition from the court in the initiating state.
(2) If the respondent or his property is not found in the county and the county attorney discovers by any means that the respondent or his property may be found in another county of this
state or in another state, he shall so inform the court and thereupon the clerk of the court shall
forward the documents received from the court in the initiating state to a court in the other county or to a court in the other state or to the information agency or other proper official of the other state with a request that it forward the documents to the proper court. Thereupon both the
court of the other county and any court of this state receiving the documents and the county attorney have the same powers and duties under this act as if the documents had been originally addressed to them. When the clerk of a court of this state retransmits documents to another court,
he shall notify forthwith the court from which the documents came.
(3) If the county attorney has no information as to the whereabouts of the obligor or his
property, he shall so inform the initiating court.
77-31-20. - Procedure. - The court shall conduct proceedings under this act in the manner prescribed by law for an action for the enforcement of the type of duty of support claimed.
77-31-21. - Petitioner absent from responding state - Continuance. - If the petitioner is absent
from the responding state and the respondent presents evidence which constitutes a defense, the
court shall continue the case for further hearing and the submission of evidence by both parties.
77-31-22. - Evidence of husband and wife. - Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure
of communications between husband and wife are inapplicable to proceedings under this act. Husband and wife are competent witnesses and may be compelled to* testify to any relevant matter, including marriage and parentage.

a foreign support order, the obligee has the additional remedies provided in the 1 olio wing sections
[77-31-33 to 77-31-37].
77-31-33. - Registration of foreign support orders. - The obligee may register the foreign support order in a court of this state in the manner, with the effect and for the purposes herein provided.
77-31-34. - Registry of foreign support orders maintained by clerk. - The clerk of the court
shall maintain a registry of foreign support orders in which he shall record foreign support orders.
77-31-35. - Petition for registration of foreign support order. - The petition for registration
shall be verified and shall set forth the amount remaining unpaid and a list of any other states in
which the support order is registered and shall have attached to it a certified copy of the support
with all modifications thereof. The foreign support order is registered upon the filing ot the petition subject only to subsequent order of confirmation.
77-31-36. - Jurisdiction and procedure. - The procedure to obtain jurisdiction ot the person
or property of the obligor shall be as provided in civil cases. The obligor may assert anv defense
available to a defendant in an action on a foreign judgment. If the obligor defaults, the court shall
enter an order confirming the registered support order and determining the amounts remaining unpaid. If the obligor appears and a hearing is held, the court shall adjudicate the issues including the
amounts remaining unpaid.
77-31-37. - Effect of registration - Enforcement procedure. - The support orders as confirmed
shall have the same effect and may be enforced as if originally entered in the court ot this state.
The procedures for the enforcement thereof shall be as in civil cases, including the power to punish
the respondent for contempt as in the case of other orders for payment of alimony, maintenance
or support entered in this state.
77-31-38. - Uniformity of interpretation. - This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
77-31-39. - Citation - Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. - This act may be
cited as the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
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